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Abstract 
This paper estimates the effect of a major education reform on the inter-
generational income mobility in Finland. The Finnish comprehensive school 
reform of 1972-1977 replaced the old two-track school system with a uniform 
nine-year comprehensive school and significantly reduced the degree of 
heterogeneity in the Finnish primary and secondary education. We estimate the 
effect of this reform on the intergenerational income elasticity using a 
representative sample of males born during 1960-1966. The identification 
strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach and exploits the fact that 
the reform was implemented gradually across country during a six-year period. 
The results indicate that the reform reduced the intergenerational income 
elasticity by about seven percentage points. 
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IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  2 1 Introduction 
One of the key questions in the study of economic inequality is the degree to 
which the economic status is transferred within families. It is often argued that 
high cross-sectional inequality is socially more sustainable if it is accompanied 
with high intergenerational mobility. In a highly mobile society, each incoming 
cohort is faced with equal opportunities to climb up the income distribution and 
neither wealth nor poverty is necessarily inherited from the parents. 
The most common approach to study intergenerational income mobility in 
economics is to estimate correlations of lifetime earnings of fathers and their 
sons. More than two decades of research has shown that there are large 
differences in mobility across countries. Income mobility is low and inter-
generational income correlation high (around 0.4) in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Mobility is much higher and intergenerational income 
correlation lower (around 0.2) in Canada, Finland, and Sweden.
1 Recent 
research also indicates that these correlations have been increasing in the 
United States and the United Kingdom over the last two decades. In Finland, 
on the other hand, intergenerational income correlation has followed a steady 
downward trend over last thirty years.
2
Apart from these facts, however, little is known about the mechanisms 
underlying the intergenerational persistence in income or about the reasons 
behind the cross-country differences. Also, even though recent research has 
started to document changes in social mobility, there is little hard evidence on 
the causes of the observed changes. Perhaps most importantly, there is no 
evidence on the effects of feasible policy instruments that could affect income 
                                                      
1 See Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) on US; Dearden, Machin, and Reed (1997) on UK; 
Corak and Heisz (1999) on Canada; Björklund and Jäntti (1997) on Sweden; and Österbacka 
(2001) on Finland. 
2 See Aaronson and Mazumder (2005) on the trends in the US; Blanden, Goodman, Gregg, and 
Machin (2004) on the trends in the UK, and Pekkala and Lucas (2006) on the trends in Finland. 
Interestingly, Pekkala and Lucas also demonstrate that the decrease in intergenerational 
correlation in Finland is mainly due to a decrease in the returns to education and to the lessening 
impact of family income on educational attainment. 
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alleviate the adverse effects of poor family background actually succeed in 
equalizing economic opportunities. 
In this paper, we estimate the effects of one such policy by examining the 
impacts of the Finnish comprehensive school reform implemented between 
1972 and 1977. The Finnish school reform is a good example of the 
educational reforms that were implemented in Europe after the Second World 
War. Very similar reforms took place in Sweden in the 1950s and in Norway in 
the 1960s.
3 These reforms were seen as an integral part in the building of 
modern welfare state and one of the main motivations for their implementation 
was precisely to enhance the equality of opportunity. 
The Finnish reform replaced old two track school system with a nine year 
comprehensive school and imposed a uniform academic curriculum on the 
entire cohort until age 16. This kind of reform should have an impact on the 
intergenerational income mobility for a number of reasons. First, the reform 
increased the length of compulsory schooling from eight to nine years. If the 
returns to increased years of schooling are positive and if those with low 
income parents are more likely to quit school after compulsory schooling, the 
reform will have the largest effect on the students from low-income families. 
Second, the reform significantly reduced the heterogeneity in the quality of 
primary and secondary education. Third, the reform postponed the age when 
the students are tracked to academic and vocational schooling from eleven to 
sixteen. If family background has a larger impact on early education choices 
postponing the tracking age lessens the effect of family background on 
educational attainment. Finally, keeping the entire cohort together in the same 
schools increases the heterogeneity of the peer groups which may also reduce 
the effect of family background. Holmlund (2006), for example, shows that 
more diverse peer groups decreased the degree of assortative mating after a 
similar reform in Sweden and that the reduction of assortative mating amplifies 
the effects of comprehensive school on the intergenerational income 
correlation. 
                                                      
3 See Lechinsky and Mayer (1990) for an overview of the comprehensive school reforms in post-
war Europe. 
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policies play a key role in the theoretical literature on intergenerational income 
mobility, starting from the work by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and 
developed by Solon (2004). More recently, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) have 
presented a model that distinguishes between early and late education and 
argue that the intergenerational income persistence is driven by parental 
investment in the primary and secondary education of their children. This 
model is in line with the growing literature on the technology of the skill 
formation surveyed by Carneiro and Heckman (2003) as well as Cunha, 
Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006). According to these authors, the 
production of human capital is characterized by strong complementarity of 
skills that are acquired early and investment in later education. Hence, policy 
interventions that target early education of individuals from a disadvantaged 
background will increase the returns to both private and public investment in 
post-secondary education, and are likely to lead to increased income mobility. 
Finally, there is some evidence that suggests that the aspects of the 
educational systems such as tracking and the heterogeneity in the quality of 
early education affect intergenerational income mobility. Dustmann (2004) 
argues that high intergenerational income correlation in Germany is at least 
partly due to the German educational system where pupils are tracked to 
academic and vocational schools already at the age of 10. In line with this 
argument, Meghir and Palme (2005) show that the comprehensive school 
reform in Sweden had a particularly strong effect on the education and income 
of high ability pupils with less educated parents. 
We estimate the effect of the reform on the elasticity of son's earnings in 
2000 with respect to father's average earnings during 1970-1990 using a 
representative sample of males born between 1960 and 1966. The identification 
strategy relies on a differences-in-differences approach and exploits the fact 
that the reform was implemented gradually during a six-year period. The 
overall intergenerational income elasticity in this sample is 0.28. The reform 
decreased the intergenerational income elasticity by approximately seven 
percentage points from the pre-reform elasticity of 0.30 or by approximately 20 
percent. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the 
Finnish comprehensive school reform in detail and argue why it provides a 
good natural experiment to study the effects of educational policies on 
intergenerational income correlation. Our identification strategy is described in 
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Longitudinal Census Data Files that we use in our analysis and in the fifth 
section we present the results. The sixth section concludes. 
2  The Finnish comprehensive school 
reform 1972-1977 
Finland followed the example of her Nordic neighbours and introduced a 
thorough comprehensive school reform in the 1970's. Similar reforms had 
taken place earlier in Sweden and Norway. These reforms are described in 
detail in Meghir and Palme (2004) and Aalvik, Salvanes and Vaage (2003). 
The main motivation for the reform was to provide equal educational 
opportunities to all students irrespective of place of residence or social 
background. Rapid re-structuring of the Finnish economy probably also played 
a role. The demand for low-skill labor in small farms and forestry had 
decreased rapidly. The growing industrial sector increased the demand for 
skilled workers. 
Prior to the comprehensive school reform, Finland had a two-track school 
system. In this system, cohorts attended uniform education only for four years 
after which they were divided into two tracks that differed both in the content 
of education, as well as, in the eligibility that they provided for further 
education. 
The pre-reform system is described schematically in the left-hand panel of 
Figure 1. All students entered primary school (kansakoulu) at age seven. After 
four years in the primary school, at age 11, the students were faced with the 
choice of applying to general secondary school (oppikoulu) or continuing in the 
primary school. Admissions to the general secondary school were based on an 
entrance examination, a teacher assessment and primary school grades. Those 
who were admitted continued their schooling in the junior secondary schools 
for five years and often went on to the upper secondary school for three 
additional years. At the end of the upper secondary school the students took the 
matriculation examination that provided eligibility to university-level studies. 
Those who were not admitted or who did not apply to the general secondary 
school continued in primary school for two more years, and spent in total six 
years in the primary school. By the beginning of 1970s most primary schools 
had continuation classes (civic schools) that kept almost the whole age cohort 
IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  6 at school up to the 8th (and in many municipalities 9th) grade. This education 
did not provide eligibility for senior secondary school or for university studies. 
After civic school most students continued into vocational education or 
finished their schooling. 
In 1970, most secondary schools were private. About 55 percent of all 
general secondary school students attended these private schools. The private 
schools collected student fees but received most of their funding as state aid 
and contributions from local municipalities. The fraction of students in the state 
schools was about 30 percent. The remaining 15 percent attended municipality-
run secondary schools, mostly founded during the 1960s. 
The curriculum in general secondary schools was very different from the 
more practical civic schools. For example, foreign languages were compulsory 
only in the general secondary school. These schools also taught more advanced 
mathematics and science whereas the focus in civic schools was on practical 
skills required in low-skill occupations. 
IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  7  
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Figure 1 Finnish school systems before and after the comprehensive school 
reform 
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The school system was reformed in the 1970s. The post-reform system is 
described in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. Previous primary school, civic 
school and junior secondary school were replaced by a nine-year 
comprehensive school. At the same time upper secondary school was separated 
from the junior secondary school to form a distinct institution. After the reform, 
all the pupils followed the same curriculum in the same establishments 
(comprehensive schools) up to age 16. After this, the students chose between 
applying to upper secondary school or to vocational schools. Admission to both 
tracks was based solely on comprehensive school grades. 
The reform also introduced a new curriculum and changed the structure of 
primary and secondary education. The new curriculum increased the academic 
content of education compared to the old primary school curriculum by 
increasing the share of mathematics and sciences. In addition, one foreign 
language became compulsory for all students. Thus, the new comprehensive 
school curriculum resembled the old general secondary school curriculum and 
exposed the pupils who, in the absence of the reform, would have stayed in the 
primary school to a significantly more academic education. 
Hence, the main changes that followed the reform were the postponement of 
tracking from the age 11 to 16 and the increase in the academic content of the 
curriculum. In addition to these fundamental changes, the reform also imposed 
a centralized control on schools at the national level and almost abolished the 
extensive network of private schools that had run general secondary school 
system by placing them under municipal ownership.  
2.2 The  implementation  of  the comprehensive school 
reform 
The implementation of the reform was preceded by a process of planning that 
lasted for two decades. Government working groups had proposed creating 
comprehensive school as early as in 1948. The first experimental 
comprehensive schools started their operation in 1967. Finally, in 1968 the 
parliament approved School Systems Act (467/1968) according to which the 
two track school system would be gradually replaced with a nine-year 
comprehensive school. The adoption of the new school system was to take 
place between 1972 and 1977 and the order in which the municipalities adopted 
the reform was to be determined by geography starting from the Northern 
IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  9 Finland where access to education was most limited. A regional imple-
mentation plan divided the country into six implementation regions and 
dictated when each region would adopt the comprehensive school system. 
Regional school boards were created to oversee the transition process. 
In each region, the five lowest primary school grades were to start in the 
comprehensive school immediately in the fall term of the year stated in the 
regional implementation plan. After this, each incoming cohort would start 
their schooling in the comprehensive school. The pupils that were already 
above the fifth grade in the year that the region started the reform would 
complete their schooling according to the pre-reform system. Thus, in each 
region it took approximately four years to complete the reform so that all the 
pupils in the grades 1-9 were in the comprehensive school. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the reform spread through Finland during 1972-
1977. The first municipalities that adopted the reform in 1972 were 
predominantly situated in the northernmost province of Lapland. In 1973 the 
reform was mostly adopted in the north-eastern regions. From thereon, the 
reform spread so that it was adopted in 1974 in the northwest, in 1975 in south-
east, in 1976 in the south-west, and finally, in 1977 in the capital region of 
Helsinki. 
IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  10  
Figure 2 Implementation of the comprehensive school reform across regions 
1972-1977 
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students relative to the relevant age cohort by school type and grade level in 
1970, before the nation-wide implementation of the reform, and in 1980 when 
most municipalities had already completed the reform. The figure shows 
clearly how in 1970, the cohort was divided almost evenly into primary school 
and general secondary school tracks after the fourth grade. In 1980, practically 
the whole age cohort stayed in the comprehensive school up to the ninth grade. 
The few remaining general secondary school students in 1980 are from the last 
pre-reform cohort in the capital region where the reform took place in 1977. 
There are two additional observations that can be made from Figure 3. First, 
approximately ten percent of the students attended (experimental) compre-
hensive schools already before the reform. These schools were scattered across 
the country, but unfortunately cannot be identified in our micro-level data. 
Second, the general level of education was clearly rising during the 1970's. The 
fraction of cohort at school on the ninth grade increased from about 70 percent 
in 1970 to practically the entire cohort in 1980. Also the fraction of students 
enrolled in the upper secondary school in 1980 exceeds the number of students 
in the last three grades in the general secondary school in 1970 by almost 
twenty percent. The increase in the fraction at school at the ninth grade is 
mainly due to the comprehensive school reform but the increase in the upper 
secondary school participation rate also reflects the general increase in the 
demand for education. Such changes might have an independent effect on the 
intergenerational income elasticity so that identifying the effect of school 
reform on intergenerational income elasticity by simple before-after com-
parisons could be misleading. 
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Figure 3 Number of students by grade level (as a percentage of the relevant 
age cohort) 
  
Source: Number of students by grade level and school type are reported in the 
Statistical Yearbook of Finland 67, 1971; Statistical Bulletin 1980:16 and Statistical 
Bulletin 1981:2 all by  Central Statistical Office, Helsinki, Finland. Population by age 
group are reported in Population Census 1970, and in Population Census 1980, Part 1 
Population structure and population changes, Central Statistical Office, Helsinki, 
Finland. 
Note:  The number of students at some grade levels is larger than the relevant birth 
cohort. This is mainly due to grade repetition in the general secondary school. 
According to the Statistical Yearbook, passing rates in the general secondary school 
were in most grade levels below 90 percent. Another reason is that some students 
entered general secondary school only after 5
th or 6
th grade in the primary school. 
Hence, though most students enter the first grade in the general secondary school in the 
year when they turn eleven there are also older students in the same grade level.   
 
2.3  The comprehensive school reform as a quasi-
experiment 
The Finnish comprehensive school reform is in many ways an ideal experiment 
for evaluating the effects of early versus late tracking on the intergenerational 
income elasticity. The regional implementation plan dictated when each 
municipality moved into comprehensive school system. Using a fixed-effects 
approach we can control for other simultaneous time trends and regional 
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factors. 
Yet, as in any real world reform there are some caveats to the approach. 
First of all, as is clear from Figure 2, the geographical implementation plan 
assigned some municipalities to early implementation groups even though most 
surrounding municipalities implemented the reform much later. The choice of 
municipalities to these early implementation groups was probably not entirely 
random. The comprehensive school reform also faced intensive resistance. 
Most common arguments against the reform were that abolishing tracking 
would reduce the quality of education. As a compromise, ability tracking was 
partially retained within the comprehensive school. Even after the reform the 
students were divided into ability groups in foreign language and math classes, 
but studied all other subjects in their regular (not tracked) classes. This ability 
grouping was eventually abolished in 1985. 
The socialization of private schools under municipal ownership was also 
opposed especially in Helsinki where some of these schools had a distinguished 
reputation. After an intensive debate, it was agreed that several private schools 
would be allowed to survive as private alternatives to the comprehensive 
schools in the Helsinki region even after the reform. Many of these still exist as 
private senior secondary schools. Another important point to note is that in 
several municipalities municipality-run experimental comprehensive schools 
already took in almost the whole age cohort a few years before the reform. In 
these municipalities the founding of these schools probably had a larger effect 
than the subsequent transformation to a comprehensive school. 
What is common to these factors is that they imply that the implementation 
of the reform in practice did not necessarily follow the implementation plan. 
One would expect these factors to attenuate the effects of the reform on 
intergenerational income mobility, but the size of the bias is difficult to assess. 
As a rough check on how contaminated the implementation of the reform 
actually was, we examined data from the Finnish Adult Education Surveys in 
1990, 1995 and 2000. We linked the municipality where the respondents lived 
in 1975 to the survey data and classified these municipalities into regions 
according to the year when the comprehensive school reform took place in 
these municipalities. Then we calculated the fraction of respondents whose 
highest education was primary school by regions and birth cohorts. The main 
lesson from these calculations was that the reform clearly had an impact. Very 
few respondents report primary school as highest education after the reform 
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reform matches the timing of the reduction of the share with primary school as 
the highest education, though in most regions the fraction with only 
compulsory school decreases already one to two years before the reform.
4
3 Estimation  methods 
Our goal is to estimate the changes in the intergenerational income elasticity 
due to the comprehensive school reform. The identification strategy relies on a 
difference-in-differences approach and exploits the fact that the reform was 
implemented gradually during a six-year period. 
We start with the standard specification relating the lifetime earnings of the 
son ys to the lifetime earnings of his father yf.  
 
 log(ys) = a + bjtlog(yf) + e    (1) 
 
The regression coefficient b provides an estimate of the intergenerational 
income elasticity. In order to examine how the reform affected this elasticity, 
we allow this regression coefficient to vary across cohorts, regions, and the 
reform status: 
 
  bjt = b0 + δRjt + ΩDj + ΨDt + ujt   (2) 
 
where j indexes region of residence, and t the birth cohort. Rjt is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the reform had taken place in the municipality by the time 
when the son was in the relevant age, Dj is the full set of region fixed effects, 
and Dt a full set of cohort dummies. Including a full set of cohort and region 
fixed-effects allows the intergenerational income elasticity to change over time 
and to vary across regions. Including cohort dummies also accounts for the fact 
that later cohorts are observed at a younger age and their earnings may be 
worse proxies of lifetime income. The only identifying assumption we impose 
is that the changes in intergenerational income elasticity are not systematically 
                                                      
4 Details on these calculations can be found from an appendix available upon request. 
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reform on the intergenerational income elasticity. 
Inserting expression (2) back into the regression equation (1) and adding the 
main effects of the region and time, as well as, the main effect of the reform 
produces  
 
log(ys,jt) = a + b0log(yf) + δ(logyf *Rjt) + Ω(logyf*Dj) + Ψ(logyf*Dt) + logyf*ujt
  +  ΦDt + ΠDj + ΓRjt + eijt (3) 
 
Estimating the effect of the comprehensive school reform on 
intergenerational income elasticity, therefore, reduces to a model where the 
son's log lifetime earnings are regressed on the father's log lifetime earnings 
interacted with the reform dummy, and a full set of interactions between region 
and the cohort dummies and the father's lifetime earnings.
5 The effect of the 
reform is identified from second level interactions i.e. from the changes in the 
effect of father's income occurring at the time of the reform. 
4 Data 
The data that we use in this paper come from the Finnish Longitudinal Census 
Data Files (FLCD) by Statistics Finland.
6 Information is based on population 
census conducted every fifth year between 1970 and 2000. Currently the 
Finnish census is entirely register-based and uses personal identity codes to 
merge information from various administrative registers. Up to 1980 census 
contained also a questionnaire mailed to every household, but even in 1970s 
variables such as annual earnings were based on tax registers. 
                                                      
5It should be noted that equation (3) is actually a random coefficient model with a 
heteroskedastic error term, which needs to be accounted when calculating standard errors for the 
estimates. 
6Data used in the analysis contain confidential information based on tax registers. All datasets 
used in the paper and their English language descriptions are available from the authors for 
replication purposes but data access requires a prior approval by Statistics Finland. Details on 
data access policy and application procedure can be found from the Statistics Finland website at 
http://www.stat.fi/meta/tietosuoja/kayttolupa_en.html. The authors are willing to assist in any 
way in gaining access to the data. 
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residence in Finland in at least one census year. As these data are based on 
administrative registers, the only reasons for the individual not to appear in the 
data are death and emigration. Hence, these data do not have the attrition 
problems that are common in the intergenerational studies. Census files also 
allow matching individuals across census years and matching family members 
to each other. 
Our data is a 10 percent random sample from the cohorts born between 
1960 and 1966. We chose to restrict the analysis to these cohorts to have two 
cohorts, 1960 and 1966, with individuals only in the pre- and in the post-reform 
school systems and five cohorts, 1961-1965, with individuals in both systems. 
We can track these individuals in all census years from 1970 to 2000. To be 
comparable with most of the earlier literature we focus on fathers and their 
sons. With our data similar analysis could also be performed for mothers and 
daughters. 
We measured sons' earnings as log taxable earnings in 2000. The measure 
includes both employment and self-employment earnings, as well as, all 
taxable benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits). In 2000, the youngest cohort in 
our sample was 34 and the oldest 40 years old As noted above, we account for 
age of measurement by allowing the effect of father's earnings to depend on 
son's age. In some robustness checks we also use earnings from 1995 and take 
the average from these two years. The main problem in using earlier years is 
that Finnish students graduate relatively late. In 1995 the youngest cohorts are 
only 29 years of age and many have just finished school or are still studying at 
a university. We also experimented with trimming the data in various ways to 
reduce the effects of extreme observations on sons' earnings but this had only a 
minor effect on our estimates. 
To calculate fathers lifetime earnings we took the average log taxable 
earnings from 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 all deflated to the 2000 prices. 
We calculated the average log earnings including all years with positive 
earnings. Using five years of data over a time span of twenty years reduces the 
bias caused by measurement error in fathers' earnings. To further reduce the 
effect of measurement errors, we top-coded the highest 1 percent of father's 
earnings by replacing them with 99th percentile of the fathers' earnings 
distribution and similarly bottom-coded the lowest one percent of fathers' 
earnings replacing them with the 1st percentile. We have no information on 
IFAU – Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  17 fathers' age so we cannot make further adjustments that would account for 
observing fathers at different ages. 
The original data does contain information on the municipality of residence 
but this information is not released to users so that individuals could not be 
identified. From our request the Statistics Finland classified the municipalities 
of residence in 1970, 1975, and 1980 to six groups according to the year when 
the comprehensive school reform was implemented in each municipality. We 
used this information together with information on the birth dates to determine 
whether individual was affected by the comprehensive school reform. We 
classified all individuals who were on the fifth grade or below when the 
municipality adopted the reform to the treatment (comprehensive school) 
group. 
As some of the effect of the reform may be due to the effect on schooling, a 
good measure of years of education would be useful. Data contains information 
on the highest degree completed that can be coded to years of education in a 
relatively straightforward way. Unfortunately, only information on post-
compulsory education is in the data. Our education measure does not 
distinguish between primary and comprehensive schooling nor between 
completing 7, 8 or 9 years of primary schooling and hence does not capture the 
most relevant changes in the length of education after the reform. 
The original 10% sample of the males born during 1960-1966 contains 
information on 27 109 individuals. Altogether 1 909 of these individuals either 
died or moved out of the country before year 2000. For 2 494 individuals the 
treatment status could not be identified because they moved between regions 
during their school years and 1 622 had no father present. Finally, in most of 
our specifications we also drop the 260 individuals who had no positive 
earnings in 2000. Our final analysis sample thus contains information on 20 
824 individuals. Out of these, 9 695 (47 %) fall into the treatment group. 
In,  Table 1 we report some summary statistics on the age and annual 
earnings of our sample of individuals and their fathers. Sons' mean earnings are 
considerably higher than fathers' mean earnings reflecting the increase in real 
wages across the generations. Also the standard deviation for sons' earnings is 
higher, mainly because fathers' earnings are averaged across five years but 
sons' earnings measured based on a single year. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Son’s age in 2000  37.03  1.98  34  40 
Son’s earnings in 2000  29 778  110 544  100  14 916 700 
Father’s average earnings 
during 1970-1990 
18 687  11 832  800  69 041 
Note: Summary statistics for 20 786 individuals in our sample and their fathers. Earnings refer to 
all taxable income in 2000 prices converted to euros. 
 
Table 2 further describes how the sample is divided into different cohorts 
and across the reform regions. There are no large differences in the cohort size 
in these age groups. The most intense reform years were 1974, -75 and -76. 
The table also shows how the treatment status depends on birth year and timing 
of the reform in the municipality of residence. The 1960 cohort was not 
affected by the reform in any region. Members of the next cohort (born 1961) 
were affected if they lived in a municipality that adopted the reform in 1972 
when they entered the fifth grade. The shaded area in the table indicates the 
affected groups in the younger cohorts. The table already indicates that there 
are a number of potential difference-in-differences estimates that can be 
calculated to evaluate the effect of the reform. 
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Table 2 The timing of the reform by cohorts and regions 
      Reform year       
Birth cohort  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  Total 
1960  6
th grade  7th grade  8th grade  9
th grade  -  -   
  N = 280  N = 437  N = 609  N = 646  N = 642  N = 348  N = 2,962  
1961  5
th grade  6
th grade  7
th grade  8
th grade  9
th grade  -   
  N = 279  N = 466  N = 624  N = 598  N = 674  N = 358  N = 2,999  
1962  4
th grade  5
th grade  6
th grade  7
th grade  8
th grade  9
th grade   
  N = 311  N = 414  N = 605  N = 599  N = 649  N = 355  N = 2,933  
1963  3
rd grade  4
th grade  5
th grade  6
th grade  7
th grade  8
th grade   
  N = 318  N = 440  N = 650  N = 648  N = 719  N = 379  N = 3,154  
1964  2
nd grade  3
rd grade  4
th grade  5
th grade  6
th grade  7
th grade   
  N = 266  N = 414  N = 651  N = 630  N = 703  N = 407  N = 3,071  
1965  1
st grade  2
nd grade  3
rd grade  4
th grade  5
th grade  6
th grade   
  N = 251  N = 411  N = 598  N = 623  N = 630  N = 383  N = 2,896  
1966  -  1
st grade  2
nd grade  3
rd grade  4
th grade  5
th grade   
  N = 260  N = 331  N = 586  N = 579  N = 665  N = 388  N = 2,809 
Total  N = 1,965 N = 2,913 N = 4,323 N = 4,323 N = 4,682  N = 2,618 N = 20,824 
Note: The shaded areas indicate cells that adopted the post-reform educational system. N refers to the sample size in each 
cell in the data that are used in the analysis.  
5 Results 
In Table 3 we first report our estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of 
earnings separately by reform regions and birth cohorts. The first column of the 
upper panel displays estimates by birth cohort. There is some indication of 
downward trend. The elasticity falls from 0.30 for the 1960 birth cohort to 0.26 
for the 1966 cohort. In addition to the effect of school reform, this drop may 
reflect other differences between cohorts, or the fact that the earlier cohorts are 
older when we observe their earnings and intergenerational earnings elasticity 
tends to increase with the age when sons' earnings are measured. In the second 
and third columns we calculate these within cohort elasticities separately in the 
regions where the reform had not taken place by the time when the cohort 
turned eleven and in regions where the system was already reformed. The 
rightmost column reports the within-cohort difference between these regions. 
In all the birth cohorts, apart from cohort born in 1961 and 1964, the estimated 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is lower in the regions where reform had 
already taken place. These differences, however, are hardly ever significant. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 repeats these calculations now examining 
changes over time within regions. Looking down in the first column one can 
note that there are substantial differences across regions. In the second and 
third column the elasticities are calculated separately for the pre- and post-
reform cohorts. In all regions except the 1977 reform region, elasticity is lower 
among post-reform cohorts. 
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Table 3 Intergenerational income correlations across birth cohorts and reform 
regions  
a) Birth cohorts 
Birth cohort  Average  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
1960 0.303 0.303    
 (0.021)  (0.021)    
1961 0.301 0.296 0.359 0.063 
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.064)  (0.069) 
1962 0.294 0.295 0.271 -0.024 
 (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.041)  (0.048) 
1963 0.244 0.313 0.141 -0.172 
 (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
1964 0.267 0.240 0.261 0.021 
 (0.022)  (0.039)  (0.028)  (0.049) 
1965 0.276 0.393 0.245 -0.147 
 (0.023)  (0.070)  (0.025)  (0.072) 
1966 0.262   0.262  
 (0.023)   (0.023)   
 
b) Reform regions 
Region Average  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
1972 0.285 0.385  0.265  -0.119 
 (0.026)  (0.068)  (0.028)  (0.071) 
1973 0.234 0.293  0.211  -0.082 
 (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.027)  (0.045) 
1974 0.256 0.289  0.230  -0.058 
 (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.037) 
1975 0.257 0.273  0.242  -0.031 
 (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.039) 
1976 0.258 0.273  0.214  -0.060 
 (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.044) 
1977 0.322 0.314  0.391  0.077 
 (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.085)  (0.086) 
Note: Numbers in the cells are coefficients of the father’s earnings in the regressions where son’s 
earnings are regressed on father’s earnings alone. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4 presents the main regression results. In column 1, we report the 
results of regressing the son's log earnings in 2000 on the father's average log 
earnings during 1970-1990 without any control variables. The resulting 
coefficient is 0.277 which is somewhat higher than the earlier Finnish 
estimates. This is probably due to the fact that we measure sons' earnings at a 
later age and use five-year averages of fathers' earnings. Jäntti and Österbacka 
(1996) obtain an estimate of 0.22 using data for cohorts born between 1950 and 
1960 with earnings measured in 1990. Österbacka (2001) obtains a much lower 
elasticity estimate of 0.13 using data for the same cohorts. Both of these papers 
use only two-year averages of fathers' earnings. Österbacka (2001) also 
includes sons' earnings from 1985 when the youngest sons are only 25 years 
old and many are still in school. Also Lucas and Pekkala (2005) report a lower 
estimate of 0.19 for cohorts born between 1960 and 1964 with earnings 
measured at age 30. 
In column 2, we add the reform dummy and the interaction between the 
reform dummy and father's earnings. The interaction term is -0.063 indicating 
that the intergenerational earnings elasticity is lower after the reform. However, 
it would be premature to interpret this difference as the effect of the reform. As 
is clear from Table 3, there are systematic differences in the intergenerational 
income elasticity across both regions and cohorts and the result in column 2 
may simply reflect the general downward trend in intergenerational earnings 
elasticity or differences in the effect of father’s earnings between the regions 
that adopted the reform early and those where the reform occurred later. 
In column 3 we account for both of these factors by adding a full set of 
cohort and region dummies and interacting these dummies with father's 
earnings as described in section 3. We normalize fathers' earnings, as well as, 
cohort and region dummies by subtracting the sample mean. This has no effect 
on our estimate on the effect of the reform on intergenerational income 
elasticity (which is an interaction of cohort, region and fathers' earnings) but 
makes the other coefficients easier to interpret. For example, the main effect of 
fathers' earnings now refers to the average effect in the sample before the 
reform and not to the effect in some specific region or in a specific cohort. The 
main effect of father's earnings on son's earnings in Column 3 is 0.298 which is 
close to our baseline estimate in Column 1 and almost identical to the estimated 
pre-reform elasticity reported in Column 2. The effect of the reform on the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity i.e. the coefficient of the interaction 
between father's earnings and the comprehensive school reform is -0.069, 
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indicating that the comprehensive school reform reduced intergenerational 
earnings elasticity by almost seven percentage points. This implies 
approximately 20% decrease in the elasticity from the pre-reform average of 
0.30. The estimate is statistically significant with a t-value of 3.11. 
Interacting father's earnings with cohort and region dummies in column 3 
accounts for any general trends and regional differences in intergenerational 
income elasticity. It is still possible that the changes in the intergenerational 
elasticity differ across regions for reasons that are unrelated to the 
comprehensive school reform. In column 4 we account for this by adding 
region-specific linear trends in intergenerational income elasticity. For 
completeness, we also include all interactions between the cohort and region 
dummies to allow for any differences in the growth rates of regional income. 
After adding these interactions, the main effect of the reform on the son's 
earnings is no longer identified. However, the effect of the reform on 
intergenerational income elasticity is still identified. The estimate is now -0.066 
very close to that in the previous column and indicating that at least the 
simplest regional trends cannot explain our findings. 
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Table 4 Regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Father's  earnings  0.277 0.297 0.298 0.296 
  (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Reform   -0.063  -0.019  … 
   (0.012)  (0.021)   
Father's earnings x Reform    -0.055  -0.069  -0.066 
   (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.031) 
Cohort dummies      √  √ 
Father’s earnings * Cohort 
dummies 
   √  √ 
Region dummies      √  √ 
Father’s earnings * Region 
dummies 
   √  √ 
Cohort * Region dummies        √ 
Region-specific trends         √ 
Observations  20824 20824 20824 20824 
R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Note: The dependent variable is son’s log earnings in 2000. Father’s earnings are measured with 
average log earnings during 1970-1990. Reform refers to the comprehensive school reform 
dummy. Cohort dummies refer to 7 birth cohort dummies that are included in the regression in 
columns (3) and (4). Father’s earnings * cohort dummies refers to the interaction of father’s 
earnings and 7 cohort dummies. Region dummies refer to 6 reform region dummies that are 
included in the regression in columns (3) and (4). Father’s earnings * region dummies refers to 
the interactions of father’s earnings and 6 region dummies. Cohort * region dummies refer to full 
set of interactions of these dummies included in the regression in column (4). Region-specific 
trends refer to region specific linear trends of the intergenerational income elasticity. Standard 
errors, reported within parentheses, are robust to clustering at the regional level. 
 
We implemented a number of robustness checks to the results reported in Table 
4. These are reported in Table 5. First, in column 1 we removed from the data 
all municipalities that implemented the reform before the other municipalities 
in the same province. In column 2 we removed observations from Helsinki 
region where the reform faced most intense resistance. These attempts to 
control for potential endogeneity in the timing of the reform had no major 
effects on the results. The estimates are slightly higher than the baseline 
estimates in Table 4, but not significantly different. 
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In column 3 we replaced son’s earnings in 2000 with average log earnings 
from 1995 and 2000. This yields somewhat lower estimate (-0.047). Also the 
main effect of fathers' earnings decreases and is now close to earlier Finnish 
estimates. These results suggest that measuring sons' earnings at a younger age 
decreases the effects of family background perhaps because those with better 
educated parents tend to stay in school longer and their earnings at younger age 
do not yet measure lifetime earnings very precisely. Finally, in columns 4, 5, 
and 6 we remove top-coding, bottom-coding and both of these from fathers' 
earnings. This has virtually no effect on the results. 
 
Table 5 Regression results – robustness checks 




















0.311 0.302  0.251  0.327  0.340  0.325 
 (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Father's 
earnings x  
-0.092 -0.074  -0.047  -0.070  -0.070  -0.070 
Reform (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.022) 
Reform -0.004  -0.008  -0.024  -0.018  -0.019  -0.018 
 (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Constant 10.002  10.009  9.903  10.020  10.021  10.021 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Observations 12040  18206 20824 20824 20824 20824 
R-squared 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.05 
Note: The dependent variable is son’s log earnings in 2000 and father’s earnings are measured 
with average log earnings during 1970-1990. In column (1), municipalities that deviate from the 
regional implementation plan are dropped from the sample. These are municipalities that 
implement the reform earlier or later than the mode of municipalities in the province. In column 
(2), Helsinki region that implemented the reform in 1977 is dropped from the sample. In column 
(3), the dependent variable is the mean of son’s 1995 and 2000 earnings. In column (4), top 
coding at 99
th percentile is removed. In column (5), bottom coding at 1
st percentile is removed. In 
column (6), all coding is removed. All regressions control for a full set of regional and cohort 
dummies as well as their interactions with father’s earnings. Reform refers to the comprehensive 
school reform dummy. Standard errors, reported within parentheses, are robust to clustering at 
the regional level. 
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In Table 6, we estimate the effects of the reform using all available pairwise 
comparisons between cohorts and regions. For example, the first entry in the 
top panel uses data only from cohorts born in 1960 and 1961 and reports the 
difference-in-differences estimate based on the fact that only those born in 
1961 who lived in the nothernmost part of the country were exposed to the 
reform. The next estimate compares cohorts born in 1960 to those born in 1962 
and so on. Altogether there are 21 possible pairwise comparisons, 14 of which 
produce a negative point estimate. Also the distribution of the estimates does 
not indicate that the overall estimates would be driven by some particular 
cohorts but rather points to there being a general tendency of decreasing effect 
of family background after the reform. The lower panel repeats the same 
exercise using fifteen possible pairwise comparisons between regions. Twelve 
of these point estimates turn out to be negative. Again there is no indication of 
the effect being due to particular regions. 
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Table 6 Regression results – pair wise comparisons  
a) By cohorts 
  1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
1960        
        
1961  -0.031       
  (0.098)       
1962  -0.101  0.007      
  (0.069)  (0.085)      
1963  -0.195 -0.162 -0.151      
  (0.063) (0.065) (0.076)      
1964  0.029 0.036 -0.007  0.020    
  (0.068) (0.062) (0.063) (0.080)    
1965  -0.086 -0.111 -0.006 -0.162 -0.145  
  (0.101) (0.072) (0.063) (0.066) (0.085)  
1966  -0.041 0.002  -0.067 -0.183 0.079  0.002 
  (0.032) (0.105) (0.074) (0.066) (0.071) (0.105)
Note: Numbers are the coefficients of the interaction of the reform dummy and father’s earnings 
in differences-in-differences regressions that are conducted pairwise by cohorts. Standard errors 
are reported within parentheses. 
 
b) By regions 
  1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1972       
       
1973  0.070      
  (0.091)      
1974  -0.016 -0.037      
  (0.068) (0.081)      
1975  -0.039 -0.112 -0.162    
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.075)    
1976  -0.098 -0.072 -0.169 0.017   
  (0.064) (0.057) (0.058) (0.077)  
1977  -0.017 -0.067 -0.019 0.102  -0.178 
  (0.087) (0.071) (0.066) (0.073) (0.097)
Note: Numbers are the coefficients of the interaction of the reform dummy and father’s earnings 
in differences-in-differences regressions that are conducted pairwise by regions. Standard errors 
are reported within parentheses. 
 
In Table 7 we examine the effects of the reform by estimating the reform 
effect separately in quintiles defined according to the fathers' earnings. Each 
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column presents the results from a separate regression where sons' earnings are 
explained by the comprehensive school reform, and dummy variables for the 
cohort and the region (Coefficients of the dummy variables are not reported in 
the table). No cross-equation restriction on the size of the cohort or region 
effects are imposed, so the estimates for the reform effects are essentially 
nonlinear version of those reported in Table 4. The pattern of the results is 
striking. The effect of the reform decreases monotonously from a positive 
effect of 0.036 in the lowest quintile to a negative effect of -0.080 for the 
highest quintile. We also repeated these calculations splitting the data 
according to father's education with very similar results. The negative point 
estimates in the highest quintiles also suggest that the comprehensive school 
reform may have had negative effects on some sub-groups. This could be due 
to a decrease in quality of education in the comprehensive school compared to 
the general secondary school before the reform, perhaps due to a more 
heterogenous and, on average, poorer family background. However we would 
hesitate to make strong conclusions given large standard errors on these 
estimates. 
 
Table 7 The effect of the reform on son’s earnings by father’s income quintiles 























Reform  0.036 0.038 -0.037  -0.051  -0.080 
  (0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) 
Constant 9.770 9.918 10.037  10.096  10.294 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) 
Observations  4165 4165 4165 4165 4164 
R-squared  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Note: Coefficients of the reform dummy in regressions where son’s log earnings are regressed on 
the reform, cohort, and regional dummies and the data are split by the quintiles of the fathers’ 
earnings distribution. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
IFAU –Educational policy and intergenerational income mobility  29  
6 Conclusions 
Even though the knowledge about intergenerational earnings correlations and 
their differences across countries has quickly accumulated over the last ten 
years, understanding about the mechanisms underlying these correlations is still 
incomplete. Many authors have emphasized the potential role of educational 
institutions in shaping the intergenerational earnings mobility. Especially the 
role of heterogeneity in the quality early education has received attention. Yet, 
there is little direct evidence on the effect of educational institutions on 
intergenerational earnings mobility. 
In this paper we estimate the effect of a major educational reform on the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity. The Finnish comprehensive school reform 
completely transformed the structure and the content of the secondary 
education in Finland. As a result of this reform, tracking to academic and 
vocational secondary education was postponed from the age 11 to 16 and a 
uniform academic curriculum was imposed on entire cohorts up to the ninth 
grade. The reform was adopted gradually by municipalities, which allows us to 
treat this reform as a quasi-experiment. 
We find that the comprehensive school reform reduced the effect of fathers' 
earnings on the sons' earnings by seven percentage points. This amounts to a 20 
percent drop in the intergenerational earnings correlation. These results suggest 
that policies that expand the access to academic secondary education may 
significantly enhance intergenerational earnings mobility. 
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